Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 underscored the need to better understand how financial market participants price and take risk. Credit default swaps (CDSs) are a particular type of financial instrument that market participants used with increasing regularity in the build-up to the crisis. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) the notional size of the CDS market (value of all outstanding contracts) at its peak before the market crash in 2007 was $57 trillion. While that number has abated mainly as a result of the multilateral netting of contracts, its size as of the first half of 2015 was $15 trillion. Clearly the CDS market remains large and active, and continues to engender a variety of research efforts aiming to better understand the effects of CDS markets on capital markets.
We investigate the role of CDS trading on the cost of capital and endogenous investment choice of multiple firms in an economy where some firms are obligors for CDS contracts and other are not. 1 We first show that the general equilibrium effects on pricing and investment of CDS trading impact the debt contracts of all firms, even the debt contracts for firms for whom CDS contracts do not trade. We then show that CDS trading impacts default premiums and alters the incentives to issue risky rather than default-risk free debt.
Building on previous work by Geanakoplos (2012, 2016) and Che and Sethi (2015) , CDS trading affects real outcomes through its influence on investors' marginal valuation of holding cash to as collateral to sell CDSs rather than holding cash to buy bonds. As originally shown by Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and subsequently by Che and Sethi (2015) , the collateral used to back CDS contracts re-allocates capital from the bond market to the CDS market, which changes the demand for bonds. We use the re-allocation channel to show that in equilibrium, when assets (firm production in our model) have correlated cash flows, an optimistic marginal buyer prices the two assets so that the relative returns to investing in either asset will be equal. The equivalent asset returns imply that when CDS trading alters the demand for one type of bond, it alters the demand for the other as well. Firms respond to changes in the cost of capital by changing their demand for investment.
We also show that endogenous default premiums coupled with endogenous investment demand lead to interesting firm financing decisions regarding the choice to issue debt that is default risk free rather than risky. Specifically, as the default premium falls, the benefit of raising elevated levels of capital that cannot be repaid when cash flow is low is reduced. As fundamentals improve firms switch to issuing fewer bonds that can be fully repaid in all states, hence the extensive default premium choice. We then show that for a given set of economy fundamentals, the extensive default risk margin changes when bond buyers are permitted to trade CDSs because CDS trading alters default premiums.
The framework in our paper is a static, general equilibrium model with two states characterized by a commonly known aggregate productivity shock with high values in the up state and low values in the down state. There are two firm types endowed with different production technologies that are symmetrically impacted by the technology shock i.e. the production technologies generate high cash flows in the up state and low cash flows in the down state. To produce, each firm endogenously issues noncontingent, collateralized debt. The firms know the true probability over the high and low cash-flow states, but this is unobservable. 2 We assume a portion of the cash flows from production are not pledgeable so that production generates positive profits and control rents. Debt financing comes from investors with heterogeneous beliefs about the probability of the future states. We first solve the baseline model without CDS for equilibrium bond prices, firm investment, and the states in which firms choose to issue debt contracts characterized by positive rather than zero default premiums. Similarly to Che and Sethi (2012) , we then extend the model to incorporate CDS contracts, where CDS purchasers must also own the underlying bond, which we call Covered CDS Economies. This restriction on CDS ownership is then removed so investors are free to purchase CDS without owning the underlying bond, in what we call naked CDS economies. 3 We begin by characterizing the equilibrium based on whether the debt contracts 2 Alternatively, one could assume that the state probabilities reveal a non-verifiable or noncontractible signal about cash flows. 3 Norden and Radoeva (2013) document that there is clear firm heterogeneity in the size of the CDS market relative to the size of the underlying bond market supporting the CDS contracts. One natural way to interpret the covered CDS economy is as a CDS market that is "small" relative to the size of the underlying bond market whereby a sufficient level of investor capital remains available to purchase bonds. Naked CDS economies in our framework would correspond to very large outstanding CDS markets relative to the underlying bond market supporting those trades.
issued have a positive or zero default premium. Low values of the technology shock always result in debt contracts that contain positive risk premiums. Such debt contracts allow the firm to invest as much as possible in the up state where the firm is always the residual equity claimant. As a result of limited liability, creditors simply take possession of firm assets in the down state. Alternatively, the capital raised for production is limited when financed via debt contracts that are repaid even when cash flows are low. The lower investment level also limits the residual equity claims in the up state, when debts can be fully repaid using either debt contract. For given intermediate values of the technology shock, debt contracts that are default-risk-free are only possible when the likelihood of the up state is sufficiently low, because firms earn equity claims in the up state only when debt issues have a positive default premium (creditors become the residual claimants in the down state). The higher the likelihood than an up state will occur, the more firms invest. The only way debt contracts with a zero default premium can be repaid in the down state as investment levels increase is if the value of the technology shock also increases. The uninteresting case is when technology shocks are sufficiently high that debt contracts never contain a positive default premium because the cash flows in the down state are always sufficient to repay debt.
We then introduce covered CDSs into this characterization of equilibrium default premiums. Consistent with Che and Sethi (2015) , covered CDSs raise bond prices and lower borrowing costs, because optimistic investors can hold more credit risk when using their cash as collateral to sell CDSs as a result of the implicit leverage embedded in CDSs rather than using their cash to buy bonds outright. The concentration of credit risk held by optimists increases the remaining supply of capital that can then finance other firm investment needs. Our analysis thus extends this mechanism to show that even when CDSs trade only on one bond, both firms' debt contracts are affected. 4 More interestingly, because investment is endogenous, firms respond to lower default premiums by issuing more debt. The consequence for the extensive default premium margin is that firms default in more states. With fixed investment, firms default in fewer states as in Che and Sethi (2015) . The difference is that the lower default premiums on risky debt contracts incentivizes firms to issue more debt at a lower cost. CDSs are redundant if the firm issues risk free debt, which means the terms of such debt contracts are unaffected by CDS trading. Thus, for a given technology fundamental in which a firm is indifferent between the two contracts in an economy with out CDSs, the firm strictly prefers to issue the risky debt contract in the economy with covered CDSs.
The restriction that CDS buyers must own the underlying bonds is then removed and naked CDS positions are the permitted. Naked CDSs also generate spillovers even when only one firm type serves as the CDS obligor. Pessimists increase the demand for CDSs, which raises CDS prices. Higher CDS prices reduce the amount of capital CDS sellers have to post to sell CDSs. The lower collateral requirement increases the embedded leverage that optimist receive and attracts more capital into derivative markets from natural bond buyers. The result is lower investor capital to fund debt for all firms and reduced investment levels. Consequently, default premiums also rise, which disincentives issuing risky debt. The tradeoff between default premiums and risky debt choice again stands in contrast to Che and Sethi (2015) . Thus, both types of CDS contracts lead to a tradeoff between borrowing costs and default risk when investment is endogenous. Taken together, the model predicts that CDS markets have "unintended" consequences on corporate debt markets that are novel to the theoretical CDS literature.
The growing body of theoretical CDS literature examines how CDSs affect, bond, equity, and sovereign debt markets (see Augustin et. al (2014) for a complete and thorough survey on the broad literature.) Our work is most closely related to a class of heterogeneous agent models developed by Geanokoplos (2012, 2016) . Fostel and Geanokoplos (2012) show that in an endowment economy, financial innovation in credit derivative markets alters asset collateral capacities, and asset prices. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2016) study the effect that credit derivatives have on whether agents engage in production, showing that credit derivatives can lead to investment beneath the first best level obtained in an Arrow-Debreu economy and can robustly destroy equilibrium. Our model is distinguishable from their models because we have multiple firm types and consider the extensive margin between default-able and risk-less debt levels, which allows us to characterize spillovers and the tradeoff between borrowing costs and default risk. They are also more interested in the manner in which financial contracts are collateralized affects investment efficiency. Che and Sethi (2015) study how CDS affect borrowing costs for a rep-resentative firm with a random output draw that raises an exogenous amount of capital. Our model adds several relevant features by explicitly modeling an endogenous production environment with different firm types. Our model also gives rise to a more in-depth discussion of the investment and default decisions because of endogenous investment. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015a) study the effects CDSs have on bond market pricing when investors have not only heterogeneous beliefs, but also heterogeneous trading frequencies. Their model is more suited to studying the effect of CDSs on secondary bond market activity. The authors do not consider investment in production or default. Common to all of these models, however, is the underlying mechanism through which CDS generate effects on the real economy. Mainly, the embedded leverage in the derivative contracts alters investor use of collateral that would otherwise be used to purchase bonds.
In a different stand of research Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show how CDS lead to an empty creditor problem from a contract theory perspective. Lenders' incentives to rollover loans are reduced, leading to increased bankruptcy and default risk. Firms internalize this effect ex ante and have stronger commitment to repay debt. Parlour and Winton (2013) show that CDS can reduce the incentives to monitor loans, thereby increasing default and credit risk. Similarly, Morrison (2005) shows that banks ability to sell off the credit risk of their loan portfolio leads firms to substitute away from monitored bank lending and into issuing risky public debt. Danis and Gamba (2015) study the trade-offs between higher ex ante commitment to debt repayment and higher ex post probability of default in a dynamic model with debt and equity issuance. They calibrate the model to U.S. data and find the positive benefits of lower CDS spreads stemming from higher repayment commitment dominate and increase welfare. The implicit assumption in all of these models is that CDS are used to hedge credit risk, which is equivalent to our covered CDS economy. All told, the increased default risk when covered CDSs trade in our model is, thus, complementary. We propose a new mechanism, though. Quite simply, lower default premiums and limited liability raise the incentives to issue bonds that default. However, none of the papers evaluate the effect on investment and default risk of situations in which investors may take purely speculative positions in the CDS market.
The default risk implicit in the empty creditor problem is that firms face debt refinancing needs that may not be met when creditors buy CDS contracts to insure against default. Thus there is a maturity-mismatch argument underlying that story.
Our theory does not require debt refinancing or maturity mis-match. In fact, debt liabilities and asset cash flows are perfectly aligned. The increase in default risk stemming from covered CDS trading in our model operates entirely through lower default premiums, which incentivizes issuing risky debt rather than debt that is default-risk-free.
Empirically, Norden et. al (2014) find evidence of interest rate spillovers in syndicated bank lending markets. The authors attribute these spillovers to more effective portfolio risk management. Our model suggests an alternative explanation operating through how derivatives change the demand for bonds when firm cash flows are correlated. Li and Tang (2016) find that there are leverage and investment spillovers between CDS reference firms and their suppliers. They argue that the higher the concentration of CDS reference entities is among a firm's customers, the lower supplier leverage ratios and investment levels are. The authors interpret their finding as the CDS market providing superior information about the credit quality of supplier firm customers (see Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Kim et. al. (2014) for works on the insider trading role of CDSs). Our model provides a complementary explanation under the interpretation that firms in our model are in the same industry. Investor demand for debt at the industry level is altered when firms in the industry become named CDS reference entities. Introducing CDSs changes the demand for bonds of other firms in the industry, and subsequent bond prices and firm investment levels.
Our paper also provides the following new testable implication: The effect on corporate default risk of trading CDS depends on whether the CDS buyer has an insurable interest in the underlying reference entity. Current empirical studies on the effect of CDSs on default risk resulting from the empty creditor problem (see Subrahmanyam, Wang, and Tang (2014) ; Kim (2013) ; and Shan, Tang, and Winton (2015)) cannot distinguish between covered and naked CDS positions.
5 Furthermore, the model's spillover implications call into question the widely employed method of propensity score matching used to control for the endogeneity of CDS issuance. Firm borrowing costs in matched samples will not be exogenous to CDS introduction if CDS trading alters the cost of capital for non-CDS reference firms whose cash flows are correlated with the CDS obligors.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we describe firms, debt contracts and investors. We then solve the baseline economy with no CDS contracts, and describe the relevant comparative statics. In Section 3, we introduce covered CDSs. In section 4 we allow for naked CDS trading. In Section 5 we close with discussion and concluding remarks.
2 Non-CDS economy 2.1 Model
Time and Uncertainty
The model is a two-period general equilibrium model, with time t = {0, 1}. Uncertainty is represented by a tree, S = {0, U, D}, with a root, s = 0, at time 0 and two states of nature, s = {U, D}, at time 1. Without loss of generality we assume there is no time discounting. There is one durable consumption good in this economy that is also the numeraire good. We will refer to this good as cash throughout the paper.
Agents

Firms
There are two firms, i = {G, B}, in the economy where firm G is the "good" type and firm B is the "bad" type. Each firm is owned and operated by a manager with access to a production technology. The managers run the firms and consume from firm profits. One could think of the positive profits earned in equilibrium as non-pledgeable control rents with which equity owners are compensated to invest in production. We use the terms control rents and profits interchangeably. 6 The only difference between the two firms is the production technology at the respective managers' disposal. The firms use the durable consumption good as an input at time 0 and produce more of this good for consumption at time 1. The respective firms have standard, decreasing returns to scale, production functions given by
i with the following properties:
The technology shock, A s , takes on binary values at time 1, with
The technology parameter is identical for both firms. Consequently, the only type of 6 We can abstract away from any agency problem between equity holders and firm managers. Alternatively, one could think of the managers as running the firm and being paid through equity. uncertainty in our model is aggregate.
7 Idiosyncratic risk would not have an effect with two firms and two states, because agents would be able to perfectly insure themselves. The only way idiosyncratic risk would have an effect is if we considered more than two states (in which case there would still be non-aggregate risk remaining even after agents trade with each other).
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For simplicity we normalize the technology shock, A U , to 1. Both firms have identical knowledge about the quality of their production process, where each firm knows that s = U arrives with probability γ and s = D with probability (1 − γ). Lastly, firms are competitive price takers in the market for the durable consumption good.
Investors
We consider a continuum of uniformly distributed risk neutral investors, h ∈ H ∼ U (0, 1), who do not discount the future. The absence of time discounting allows us to focus only on default premiums without loss of generality. Investors are characterized by linear utility for the single consumption good, x s , at time 1. Each investor is endowed with one unit of the consumption good, e h = 1, and assigns probability h to the up state U and (1 − h) to the down state D. Thus, a higher h denotes more optimism and agents agree to disagree. The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function for investor h is given by
We assume a uniform distribution for tractability. The results will hold in general as long as the beliefs are continuous and monotone in h. In terms of investor preferences, we assume risk-neutrality but the results are also qualitatively preserved with common investors beliefs and state contingent endowments.
Firm financing
We assume the firms are highly leveraged and optimally raise capital from investors by issuing debt. Our aim is to better understand the effect of credit derivatives 7 It may be natural to think of the model as one of intra-industry debt financing in which two firms in the same industry are equally affected by a industry specific technology shock. 8 We leave this to further research. Also, it is interesting that in considering only aggregate risk, the firms differ only in the productivity and CDSs still have a big effect. With more dimensions of heterogeneity we predict the effect to be even bigger. on the debt-issuance decision. The effect of credit derivatives on a more general capital allocation problem is an interesting natural extension of the model. At time 0, firms issue debt contracts that specify a fixed repayment amount (bonds) and are collateralized using the pledgeable proceeds from output, which we refer to as cash flows. The lender (investor) has the right to seize an amount of the collateral up to the value of the promise, but no more. This enforcement mechanism ensures that the firm will not simply default on all promises at time 1.
Each bond, priced p i at time 0, promises a face value of 1 upon maturity. The two firms issue bonds denoted by q i at time 0. In the up state, each bond returns full face value. 9 In the down state bonds pay creditors a deliverable, d s i = min 1,
. If debt obligations are not honored, creditors become the residual claimants of the firm and consume from the cash flows generated from production. Firm borrowing costs, which are equivalent to bond default premiums because there is no time discounting, are denoted by r i , and equal to the difference in what the firm owes on maturity and the amount of capital they receive at the time of issuance, r i =1 − p i . Figure 1 depicts the bond payouts.
Firm maximization problem
Each firm chooses an investment amount, I i , given the market price of bonds to maximize profits. Since firms have no initial endowment, all their investment for production will have to be financed by issuing debt. Hence I i = p i q i . Let π s i denote state-contingent firm profits. Firms solve the following program:
Investor Maximization Problem
We can now characterize each agents' budget set. Given bond prices p i , each investor, h ∈ H, chooses cash holdings, x h 0 , and bond holdings, q h i , at time 0 to maximize utility given by (1) subject to the budget set defined by:
Each investor consumes from two potential sources in either state of nature: consumption based on risk-less asset holdings and consumption based on their total bond portfolio. In the up state, consumption from bond holdings is equal to the quantity of bonds an investor owns in his portfolio because each bond has a face value of 1. In the down state, firms may default on their debt, in which case investors take ownership of the firm and consume from the firms' available assets on a per0-bond basis. Furthermore, note that we rule out short sales of bonds by assuming q i ∈ R + . 10
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the non-CDS economy is a collection of bond prices, firm investment decisions, investor cash holdings, bond holdings and final consumption deci-
such that the following are 10 We believe this is not a terribly unreasonable assumption given the known difficulty in borrowing corporate bonds. CDS markets are far more liquid than secondary bond markets. Furthermore, in the spirit of Banerjee and Graveline (2014) derivative pricing in our model contains no noise, as will be clear in the following section, because the investors know technology fundamentals. Banerjee and Graveline show in proposition 6 that imposing a short-sale ban will have no effect on bond prices when investors can trade in derivatives with no noise. satisfied:
Condition (1) says that at time 0 the entire initial cash endowment is held by investors for consumption or used to purchase bonds from firms. Condition (2) says the goods market clears at time 1 such that all firm output is consumed either by firm managers via profits or by creditors via bond payments. Condition (3) corresponds with the capital market clearing conditions. Condition (4) says that firms choose investment to maximize profits, and condition (5) states that investors choose optimal portfolios given their budget sets.
Bond pricing
We begin by presenting how equilibrium is characterized, which will lay the foundation for analyzing the spillover effects in subsequent sections. We then analyze the firm investment/production problem in more detail to show how the choice to issue debt with or with out a positive default premium will also be affected by derivative trading.
Equilibrium in heterogeneous investor belief models, such as the one employed here, is based on marginal investors. In equilibrium, as a result of linear utilities, the continuity of utility in h, and the connectedness of the set of agents, H = (0, 1), there will be marginal buyers, h 1 > h 2 , at state s = 0. Every agent h > h 1 will buy bonds issued by firm B, every agent h 2 < h < h 1 will purchase type-G bonds, and every agent h < h 2 will remain in cash. This regime is shown in figure 2 . The marginal buyer indifference between the returns of the various assets available in the economy will to be crucial in subsequent sections for understanding why introducing derivatives affects the default premium for all debt contracts in the economy and not just for those contracts on which the derivatives are based. With this, we now characterize the relationship between the respective firms' bond prices.
Proposition 1
In any equilibrium without derivatives where both firm types receive funding and pay positive default premiums, type G bonds are priced higher than type B bonds.
Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition is simple, in that the asset value of the more productive firm is always higher than the less productive firm. Debt holders will therefore be willing to pay a higher price for those bonds, since they are the residual claimants of the assets given default. Since both bonds pay 1 in full at s = U , more optimistic investors would rather hold the cheaper of the two assets, which are firm-B bonds. The two marginal investor indifference equations can be written as:
Equation (3) says that the more optimistic marginal buyer, h 1 will be indifferent to the expected returns on type-B and -G bonds. Equation (4) says that the less optimistic marginal buyer, h 2 , will be indifferent between the return on type-G bonds and cash. The bond market clearing conditions for type-B and -G bonds require that the two bond prices be determined by the purchasing power of the respective sets of investors buying the bonds. That is
= q b for type-B bonds and
= q g for type-G bonds. This characterization clearly shows that bond prices are jointly determined based on how the marginal investors view the respective returns. A change in the price of one bond necessarily changes the expected relative return any investor places on the two assets. For example, an exogenous decrease in the price makes it more attractive and means it will become strictly preferred to the more expensive asset unless there is a corresponding change in the relative expected cash flows to which bond holders are entitled. In equilibrium, as more capital moves to the cheaper bond from the more expensive bond, the latter's price must also fall and will be marginally priced by a less optimistic investor.
Default premium
We now turn to the issue of when it is optimal to issue debt with positive rather than zero default premium. The maximization problem boils down to choosing an investment, I i , that at s = D ensures either repayment or, through limited liability, that the firm always defaults. In the former, bonds will be priced without risk: p f i = 1 where the super-script f denotes default risk-free pricing. In the latter case, bonds will carry a positive risk premium, p ρ i < 1, where the super-script ρ denotes a positive risk premium. Let the corresponding profit levels from each of these investment decisions be denoted by Π 
The first-order conditions for the two investment levels are
These are the standard marginal products of capital that must equal the marginal costs of capital conditions. The default-risk-free condition in (6) takes into account that all debt is fully repaid at s = U, D through the expected value of the technology shock, γ
We begin by analyzing bonds with positive risk premiums. Using (5) and I
Intuitively, recoverable firm asset values are proportional to the technology shock parameter, 0 < A D < 1, and the productivity parameter, 0 < α i < 1. The recovery value also places a natural restriction on the relationship between the two parameters. Specifically, A D < α i ensures that there is, at least fundamentally, default risk in the economy. Since α g < α b there are different values of A D for which there is fundamental default risk for the two firms, 0 < A
As we show in subsequent discussion, for a given (α G , α B )-pair, whether or not firms issue bonds with positive default premiums depends on the given A D , γ -tuple.
Turning now to risk-free bonds. Clearly, p f * i = 1 if firms always repay in all states. The risk free bond price gives the optimal investment level:
Using (6) and I
gives a relationship between the good state probability, γ, and the value of the technology shock, A Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition underlying proposition 2 is that the cash flows from production must be sufficiently high in bad states (high A D i ) for the firm to always honor its debt obligations. Additionally, the more likely it is that good states will arrive (high γ) the more firms invest because doing so increases their expected equity value given that the face value of debt is always equal to one. This means that cash flows in the down state must be even higher as γ increases if the firm is to fully honor its debt obligations.
We must still determine I * i α i , γ, A D in equilibrium. We can easily calculate the different profit levels, Π
Because debt is always repaid, profits are only affected by state probabilities, γ, through the affect on bond quantities, q f * i . Moreover, by proposition 2, an equilibrium in which risk-free bond pricing exists must be characterized by
, borrowing with a zero default premium is not possible, and profits are calculated using the optimality condition (5) along with (2):
Note from (5) that good state probabilities, γ, do not influence the investment levels, I Equilibrium debt contracts characterized by positive default premiums must allow the firm to invest more than debt contracts that are risk free do, and the difference in the two amounts is proportional to the likelihood that the equity claimants retain positive equity γ, γ > This result says that for intermediate values of stochastic cash flows, firms must optimally choose between debt for which they can always repay and debt that carries a positive default premium and will not be repaid when cash flows are low. Firms may only issue debt without (with) credit risk in this region if the likelihood that cash flows are good is sufficiently low (high) because when good cash flow states are likely, the default premium to issue debt will be lower, which incentivizes raising more capital that cannot be repaid if bad states arrive. Alternatively, when good cash flow states are less likely, the default premium will be higher, which incentivizes issuing smaller amounts of debt that can repaid given bad news.
This example gives results for default premiums, marginal buyers, and the remainder of the endogenous variables in the economy for the listed parameters. 
Covered CDS economy
In this section, we incorporate CDSs into the baseline model. A CDS is a financial contract in which the CDS seller compensates the buyer for losses to the value of an underlying asset for a specified credit event or default. The underlying assets in this economy are firm bonds. CDS contracts compensate buyers with the difference between a bond's face value at maturity and its recovery value at the time of the credit event. Thus, CDS allow investors to hedge against idiosyncratic default risk.
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We first consider covered CDSs, in which buyers are required to also hold the underlying asset (that is, that bond for whom the CDS is written). We assume the seller must post enough collateral to cover the payment in the worst case scenario to rule out any counter-party risk. Let q h ic be the number of CDSs that investor h can sell, and let p ic be the CDS price. Therefore, the total cash that investor h holds to collateralize CDS contracts, including payments received for selling CDSs, will equal the maximum possible CDS payout in the event of firm default, times the number of CDS contracts sold:
Solving for the total number of CDS contracts gives 
The first two equations are analogous to the investor budget set in the non-CDS economy. The third equation states that since CDS buyers are required to hold the underlying asset, the maximum number of CDS contracts that can be purchased cannot exceed the number of bonds owned. Note that there is no sign restriction on q h ic . Selling CDS implies that q h ic < 0, while q h ic > 0 implies purchasing CDS. Short selling of bonds is still ruled out by the restriction q i ∈ R + as in the non-CDS economy.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the covered-CDS economy is a collection of bond prices, CDS prices, firm investment decisions, investor cash holdings, bond holdings, CDS holdings and final consumption decisions,
, such that the following are satisfied:
Condition (1) states that all of the initial endowment is either held by investors or used to purchase bonds. Condition (2) says the goods market clears such that total firm output is consumed by firm managers via profits and used to repay bond holders. Condition (3) says that the CDS market is in zero net supply, while (4) states that the capital market clears. Condition (5) says firms choose investment to maximize profits. Lastly, (6) states that investors choose a portfolio that maximizes their utility, given their budget set.
We make use of the following lemma to characterize equilibrium in the covered CDS economy.
(q i ) < 1, then no bonds for which CDS are sold will be purchased without CDS.
Proof: See appendix B.
The intuition behind lemma 1 is that any investor optimistic enough to buy a bond without a CDS will be better off selling CDSs on that bond. Additionally, if the recovery value of the bond is zero, then CDSs and bonds pay the same amount in both states, thus making CDSs redundant assets. Finally, if the recovery value of the bond is 1, then bonds are risk free and no CDSs will trade in equilibrium.
Borrowing costs and spillovers
We introduce CDSs only on one firm's debt to establish the borrowing cost spillover result. For expositional purposes, let investors issue CDSs on firm-B debt.
12 As in the non-CDS economy, there will be marginal buyers, h 1 > h 2 . In equilibrium, every agent h > h 1 will sell CDSs on type-B debt, every agent h 2 < h < h 1 will purchase type-G debt, and every agent h < h 2 is indifferent to holding covered CDS and cash. More specifically, agents h < h 2 hold a portfolio of covered positions on type-B and cash. 13 Compared with the non-CDS economy, covered CDSs lower borrowing costs for the firm on which CDSs are traded-firm B, because the derivative allows the optimists who believe firms will always repay their debt to hold all of the credit risk. Because CDS sellers only have to hold a portion of their collateral to cover the expected loss given default, which is always less than the price of the bond, each individual CDS seller can hold more credit risk than they could when just buying bonds. The resulting marginal buyers are therefore more optimistic than in the economy with out CDSs. The marginal buyer indifferent equations are now
The CDS sellers' aggregate purchasing power to price CDSs is now
The purchasing power of the marginal type-G bond buyers takes the same form as the non-CDS economy:
= q g , with different marginal buyers. Lastly, because some agents hold a portfolio of covered CDS and cash, a non-arbitrage pricing condition between the CDS and bond market links the price of credit risk in the CDS market with the default premium in the bond market: p bc + p b = 1. Consistent with Che 12 The qualitative results for borrowing cost spillovers and endogenous positive default premiums are not particular to the firm's debt from which the CDSs derive their value. Endogenizing CDS issuance is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this paper. Work by Banerjee and Graveline (2014), Bolton and Oehmke (2011), and Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015b) provides nice reference points for thinking about why we see CDSs emerge on some firms and not others. 13 In equilibrium, every agent h < h 2 will be indifferent between cash and a covered position and each agent will hold a portfolio consisting of 30.43% in covered positions and the rest in cash, for the same parameters chosen in example 1. To compute this portfolio allocation we simply divide the number of type B bonds investors hold by their total cash endowment, Proof. See appendix B.
More interestingly, because our model has an additional asset with a different fundamental valuation based on heterogeneous but correlated cash flows, there are general equilibrium borrowing cost implications for firm G even though investors do not trade CDSs on firm-G debt.
Corollary 1 The default premium for a firm without CDSs trading is affected by
CDSs trading on other firms with correlated cash flows.
Proof. See appendix B.
This result follows directly from proposition 4 because the marginal CDS seller who prices the credit risk for firm B is more optimistic than the corresponding marginal bond buyer in the non-CDS economy. Because each CDS seller buys credit risk using collateral in the amount equal to the loss given default of the underlying bond contract, a given set of investors of size (1 − h 1 ) in the non-CDS economy have more purchasing power to buy credit risk in the covered CDS economy. Firm G, competing with firm B to raise capital from optimistic investors, can therefore issue debt to more optimistic set of investors than in the non-CDS economy, as well. This increase in the set of investors financing both firms' debt issuances raises bond prices for firm G.
The fact that cash flows are correlated across good and bad states is also important. Take the limiting example in which firm G's cash flows are high at s = D and low at s = U . The firm would then find it optimal to issue debt to those investors most willing to pay for an asset whose payouts are most correlated with their subjective beliefs. Firm G would then prefer to issue debt to pessimists who would pay a higher price for an asset that pays more at t s = D with certainty than to optimists who would pay high prices for high payouts in the exact opposite states. It is this interpretation of the model that leads naturally to an intra-industry or geographically limited model of debt financing. Firms in the same industry or geographic area may Figure 4 and table 2 show the corresponding marginal buyer regimes and endogenous variables in the economy for the same parameters as in example 1. Note that even though the CDS trades on firm B, the price of firm G debt rises from p G = .8099 to p G = .8269. For the same parameters as in example 1, Figure 5 shows the equilibrium shift in the set of investors financing firm G's debt issuance in the non-CDS economy and the covered CDS economy with CDSs only trading on firm B. 
CDSs and credit risk
In this section we show that the increase in bond pricing attributed to CDS trading also induces firms to issue debt that carries a positive default premium for more values of the down state probability than in the non-CDS economy. As shown in appendix A for proposition 2, the threshold values of A D i above which issuing default-risk-free debt is possible are determined only by parameters γ and α i . CDSs do not change any of the fundamentals of the economy, so the threshold values are the same as in the non-CDS economy. What does change is the cost of issuing debt with a positive default premium and hence the relative costs and benefits of issuing such debt claims.
To see how CDSs affect the extensive default premium choice margin, recall that the necessary and sufficient condition to issue debt with a positive default premium is that the debt must yield higher control rents to equity claimants, which can be simply expressed through the optimal debt issuance levels of the two debt contracts: γq ρ * i > q f * i , where the hat corresponds to the non-CDS economy quantities. The left-hand side is the expected control rent associated with issuing debt with positive default premium and the right-hand side is the control rent from issuing debt that is always repaid. Because the default-risk-free contract is purely a function of fundamentals, the right-hand side of the inequality remains unchanged. From proposition 4 we know that firms borrow at lower borrowing costs and issue more bonds when CDSs The endogeneity of production in the economy helps establish this result. In Che and Sethi (2015) , covered CDS also lower borrowing costs, but they increase the ability to repay debt for any given investment level. The positive relationship between covered CDSs and ability to repay debt would be true in our model if I i were fixed. When endogenized however, firms respond to bond pricing by issuing more debt. Because production rents are only captured in the up state when the debt raised to produce carries a positive default premium, a decrease in default premiums raises the resulting profitability from issuing these debt contracts, even though fundamentals do not change. If, in expectation, there was a state probability in the non-CDS economy for which the firm was indifferent between issuing either debt contract, the debt contract with a positive default premium would be strictly preferred. The decrease in default premiums and increase in investment are offset by the increase in default incidence at s = D.
Naked CDSs
In this section, we extend the model by allowing investors to hold naked CDS positions: investors do not need to hold the underlying asset to purchase a CDS. A naked CDS buyer expects to receive the difference between the face value of the bond and its value at the time of default. The naked CDS payout structure is given in figure 6 . Furthermore, notice that buying a naked CDS is equivalent to buying the Arrow-down security, since it pays out only when s = D.
At time 0. an investor can purchase a naked CDS by paying p ic . The buyer believes with probability h that the up-state will occur at time 1, the firm will not default, and the CDS will not payout. The buyer believes with probability (1 − h) that the downstate will occur at time 1. In this case, the buyer expects to receive the difference between the face value of the bond and its recovery value, (1 − d s i ). We continue to assume that CDS sellers post enough collateral to cover payments in the worst-case scenario. Therefore the maximum CDS payout carries over from previous economies and is given by equation (9) . Moreover, the implications of lemma 1 still hold and no bond is bought without credit protection if CDSs trade on that bond.
Investor maximization problem
Given bond and CDS prices (p i , p ic ), each investor chooses cash, bond, and CDS holdings, x h 0 , q h i , q h ic , to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget set:
The investor's budget set is exactly the same as the one described in the covered CDS economy except that investors can now buy CDS without holding the underlying asset. Hence there is no restriction tying the maximum number of CDS contracts bought to the number of bonds held.
Equilibrium existence and institutional investor
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014) identify an existence problem in production economies wherein collateral equilibrium may breakdown in the presence of naked CDS. In an earlier working paper version of their paper, Che and Sethi (2010) assume that a retail investor will always demand bonds so that equilibrium does not break down. We follow this assumption to compute equilibrium. Lastly, the presence of the institutional investor would not affect equilibrium in the non-CDS and covered-CDS economies. Limiting the investor's risk exposure of the investor will prevent it from purchasing bonds without any CDS protection. Thus the investor will remain in cash in an economy without CDS. Moreover, in the covered CDS economy, agents who did not sell CDS held a portfolio of cash and covered CDS positions. The institutional investor could just as easily replace the agents' covered CDS positions, leaving them only holding cash and the equilibrium unperturbed. 
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the naked-CDS economy is a collection of bond prices, CDS prices, firm investment decisions, and investor consumption decisions,
such that the following are satisfied:
Condition (1) states that all endowments, including the retail investor's, go to one of three uses: (a) held as collateral to issue CDSs, (b) held by the retail investor for consumption, or (c) used by the retail investor to purchase bonds and covered CDSs. Condition (2) says the goods market clears such that total firm output is consumed by firm managers in the form of profits and is used to repay bond holders. Condition (3) says that the CDS market is in zero net supply because all CDSs purchased as naked investments or by the retail investor as covered investments will be equal to all of the CDS issued. Condition (4) is the capital market clearing condition. Condition (5) says firms choose investment to maximize expected profits. Condition (6) states that investors choose a portfolio that maximizes their utility given their budget sets, and condition (7) says that the retail investor holds a portfolio that maximizes his utility given his budget set.
Borrowing costs and spillovers revisited
In this section, we show that the borrowing cost spillovers are also present in the naked CDS economy. To keep the examples comparable across economies, we continue to examine an economy for which CDSs trade only on firm-B debt. As before, there will be marginal buyers, h 1 > h 2 . In equilibrium, every agent h > h 1 will sell CDSs on typeB debt, every agent h 2 < h < h 1 will purchase bonds issued by type G, and every agent h < h 2 will buy naked CDSs on type-B debt. Naked CDSs raise type B's borrowing costs because pessimists are able to purchase Arrow-Down securities created through the CDS contract, which increases the price a CDS seller receives for selling such contracts. As the price increases, investors can further leverage their cash endowments because they have to hold less of their own capital to issue CDSs. The resulting marginal CDS sellers are now more pessimistic than the bond buyers in the non-CDS economy. The marginal buyer indifference equations in the naked CDS economy are:
(
Note here that firm-G bonds are priced by two separate investors. The more optimistic investor, h 1 , is indifferent between selling a CDS on firm-B debt and buying firm-G bonds in (12) . The more pessimistic investor, h 2 , is indifferent between buying a CDS on firm-B debt and buying firm-G bonds in (13) . This wedge between the Arrow-Up and the Arrow-Down securities means even though the arrow claims are traded, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is not established in this economy, as in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) . The market-clearing conditions that establish the total purchasing power investors have to clear the markets are
for the CDS market on firm B and
= q g for the bond market on firm G . Lemma 1 from the covered CDS economy continues to hold, implying that no bonds on which CDS are traded will be purchased without insurance. Furthermore, we derive the following lemma to solve for equilibrium in the naked CDS economy.
Lemma 2 Only the institutional investor holds cash or covered assets in equilibrium.
The intuition for the optimists holds from lemma 1. The for pessimists, any investor pessimistic enough to remain in cash will be better off buying a naked CDS. Thus, only the institutional investors hold risk-free assets. The borrowing cost implications for the economy are similar to those in Geanakoplos (2012 and and Che and Sethi (2015) and are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Naked CDS lower bond prices for the firm for whom CDS are written.
Proof. See appendix B. 
As described above, the derivative markets attracts more optimists to sell CDS as pessimists bid up the prices of derivative contracts. This "capital reallocation channel" is common to a class of heterogeneous agent models used to analyze CDS and bond market pricing (see Geanakoplos (2012 and , Che and Sethi (2015) , and Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) for other examples). What is new in our model in terms of borrowing cost implications, is, once again, the fact that firm G will also be affected by the movement of capital from bond market purchases to collateralizing derivative contracts because firm G's cash flows from production are correlated with firm B's. Figure 7 and table 3 show the marginal buyer characterization of equilibrium and the values of the endogenous variables for the same parameters used in the non-CDS and covered CDS Economies. Figure 8 shows the shift in marginal investors financing firm-G debt in the naked CDS and covered CDS economies. 
CDS and default risk revisited
As with the covered CDS economy, the default-risk-free contract is unchanged. The debt levels that are sustainable and permit firms to fully honor debt obligations in all states are driven by economy fundamentals, α i , γ, A D . Therefore, the change in the default premium associated with issuing a risky debt contract alters the extensive margin between risky and risk-free contracts. Using proposition 6, we know that default premiums increase in the naked CDS economy and firms respond by issuing less debt,q Propositions 5 and 7 show that the effect on default premiums and endogenous investment of trading CDSs can be counterbalanced by the effect on the decision to issue risky rather than risk-free debt. On the one hand, CDS contracts allow the leveraging of cash, which changes the demand for bonds and the default premiums at which firms issue risky debt. Risk-free debt contracts, on the other hand, are determined by fundamental technology processes and state probabilities, and they are therefore unaffected by the presence of derivative trading. The fact that derivative trades affect default premiums when firms issue risk debt implies that the relative incentives to choose between debt contracts that do or do not contain default risk are altered even when fundamentals do not change. Thus, financial innovation through derivative trading may effect not only the intensive margin and how much debt to issue, but the extensive margin of whether debt contracts contain default risk.
Discussion and concluding remarks
Credit derivatives can induce a tradeoff between firm borrowing costs and default probability. Lower default premiums incentivize investment for which debt obligations are not met in states characterized by negative productivity shocks. Alternatively, higher default premiums lead to debt financing that firms are more likely to repay for given productivity shocks. Financial instruments that effect default premiums can induce such a tradeoff even when nothing fundamental changes in the economy. In terms of our model, the set of parameters γ, A D in the different economies for which each firm defaults changes as CDS are introduced. Figure 9 illustrates the effect covered CDSs have on default relative to the non-CDS economy. The parameters are those chosen for example 1 throughout the paper. The diagram shows the different possible default regimes. The area labeled "full risk regime" is the set of parameter values for which both firms default when s = D. Similarly, "partial risk regime" corresponds to the region where only type-B defaults, and neither firm defaults in the "risk free regime." The individual cells outlined and labeled "default G" and "default B" highlight the impact of introducing covered CDSs. For example, relative to the non-CDS economy, all of the default B cells indicate that firm B defaults on its debt obligations. Likewise, relative to the non-CDS economy, all of the default G cells indicate that firm G defaults on its debt obligations. The likelihood of s = U given by γ is on the vertical axis (increasing γ moving downward) and the value of the technology shock, A D , on the horizontal (increasing A D going from left to right).
You can see that for a given A be black in the non-CDS economy). 15 The associated increase in default risk in the covered CDS economy is consistent with the empty creditor story. However, our mechanism is novel and does not rely on a maturity mis-match between firm assets and liabilities or rollover risk and coordination problems. Covered CDS can increase default risk through the pricing incentives to issue debt that defaults in bad times even when assets and liabilities are perfectly aligned and no maturity-mismatch is present. Additionally, the model shows that having an insurable interest and owning the CDS on that interest (covered) leads to very different default implications than taking a speculative position (naked). Current empirical studies cannot distinguish between covered and naked positions at the CDS-counterparty level and thus only test the covered story of the empty creditor problem.
Figure (10) shows the equilibrium comparing the covered CDS and naked CDS economies for the parameters used in example 1. It is the analogue to figure 9 in that it shows the effect of introducing naked CDSs when CDSs already exist. We make this comparison to show the effect on default of banning naked CDS; presumably, covered CDS would still be allowed. The cells labeled "No Def G" indicate that firm G switches from defaulting on debt obligations in covered CDS economies to fully repaying when naked CDS are introduced. Similarly, the cells labeled "No Def B" indicate that firm B switches from defaulting on debt obligations in covered CDS economies to fully repaying when naked CDS are introduced. In contrast to the We further show, through the capital reallocation channel other models have highlighted, that when the productive assets on which CDSs trade have correlated cash flows, the returns between the debt contracts that finance the assets must be equal in equilibrium. This equality leads to spillover effects even as CDS markets do not exist on all underlying assets. The spillover effects include changes in bond pricing, investment demand, and default risk. Thus, our model provides a new mechanism through which to think about the empirical results on the leverage and investment externalities of CDS trading identified by Li and Tang (2016) .
A Appendix
A.1 Partial-Risk
A.1.1 Non CDS Equilibrium
This equilibrium is characterized by the fact that Firm G is always able to fully repay its debt while the bad firm defaults when s = D. This equilibrium will be characterized as a combination of the Risk-Free Regime presented in the preceding section and the Full-Risk Regime described in Section 2.2.
The system of equations that characterizes equilibrium in the non-CDS economy includes eight endogenous variables (p i , q i , I i , h 1 , h 2 ) and is as follows:
Equations (1) & (2) are used to determine bond prices in equilibrium. Equation (3) corresponds to type G's optimizing decision that takes into account firm profitability in the down-state while (4) corresponds to type B's optimizing decision by considering profits exclusively in the up-state. Equation (5) says that each firms' bond issuance q i will be in accordance with the desired investment level given bond market prices. Finally, equations (6) & (7) correspond to the bond market clearing conditions for the respective firms.
A.1.2 Covered CDS Equilibrium
CDS allow investors to sell insurance on firm default. Note that in the Covered-CDS Economy, CDS buyers are required to hold the underlying asset. In equilibrium, CDS will only be traded on type B debt since type G does not default in the Partial-Risk Regime.
The system of equations that characterizes equilibrium in the Covered-CDS Economy includes ten endogenous variables (p i , p bc, q i , q bc, I i , h 1 , h 2 ) and is as follows:
Equations (1) & (2) are used to determine bond prices in equilibrium. Equations (3) & (4) corresponds to the firms' optimizing decisions. Equation (5) says that each firms' bond issuance q i will be in accordance with the desired level given market price for bonds. Equations (6) & (7) correspond to the CDS market and bond market clearing conditions respectively. Equation (8) is a non-arbitrage pricing implication of assuming the return to holding a covered CDS position is equivalent to holding cash and will be priced accordingly. Equation (9) solves for the number of CDS contracts an individual investor can sell given their initial endowment.
A.1.3 Naked CDS Equilibrium
In the Naked-CDS Economy CDS buyers are not required to hold the underlying asset. In equilibrium, CDS will only be traded on type B debt since type G does not default in the Partial-Risk Regime.
The system of equations that characterizes equilibrium in the Naked-CDS Econ-omy includes ten endogenous variables (p i , p bc, q i , q bc, I i , h 1 , h 2 ) and is as follows. Equations (1) & (2) are used to determine bond prices in equilibrium. Equations (3) & (4) corresponds to the firms' optimizing decisions. Equation (5) says that each firms' bond issuance q i will be in accordance with the desired level given market price for bonds. Equations (6) & (7) correspond to the CDS market and bond market clearing conditions respectively. Equation (8) is a non-arbitrage pricing implication of assuming the return to holding a covered CDS position is equivalent to holding cash and will be priced accordingly. Equation (9) solves for the number of CDS contracts an individual investor can sell given their initial endowment. ). This means that the bonds deliver the same in the up-state at time 1, and the type g bond returns strictly more than the type b bond in the down state, hence d γ , α i , it will be the case that there is an upper-bound on the probability of good news γ < γ that will push the firm into issuing bonds with a positive default premium. Lemma 1. Proof. Suppose to the contrary that bonds are purchased unprotected. Then it must be the case that the utility of the agent who buys the unprotected bond Proposition 4. Proof. This follows directly from Che & Sethi (2014) with two differences. 1) the marginal investor indifferent between selling CDS and having exposure to another risky asset does not directly price the bond for which the CDS is sold. The investor prices the return to the CDS relative to the return on the alternative risky asset. 2) investment is endogenous so that supply of bonds q i is not fixed.
B Appendix Omitted Proofs
Suppose to the contrary thatp i ≤p i , i = G, B, wherep i is firm is bond price in an economy with covered CDS andp i is the bond price in a Baseline Economy. The expected return any given investor h places on selling a CDS is given by is not insured, and investors receive a price for selling CDS that they can use as collateral for additional contracts p c i . This is a decreasing function of bond prices because higher bond prices mean lower CDS prices. Higher bond prices mean investors need to post more of their own cash as collateral to sell a CDS, which lowers the expected return to their collateral. Thus, as bond prices decrease, the marginal investor indifferent to selling a CDS and buying an alternative risky asset is less optimistic because the returns to selling a CDS are increasing relative to the return on holding the alternative asset. Therefore, h 1 (p i (q i ) , d 
